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We present a stable and deterministic quantum key distribution (QKD) system based on differ-
ential phase shift. With three cascaded Mach-Zehnder interferometers with different arm-length
differences for creating key, its key creation efficiency can be improved to be 7/8, more than other
systems. Any birefringence effects and polarization-dependent losses in the long-distance fiber are
automatically compensated with a Faraday mirror. Added an eavesdropping check, this system is
more secure than some other phase-coding-based QKD systems. Moreover, the classical information
exchanged is reduces largely and the modulation of phase shifts is simplified. All these features
make this QKD system more convenient than others in a practical application.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD)[1] supplies a novel way for generating a private key securely between two legitimate
users, say the sender Alice and the receiver Bob. Its security is based on the laws in quantum mechanics such as
noncloning theorem, coherence of entangled systems, and quantum measurement, but not the computation difficulty
with a limited computation power. As an unknown quantum state cannot be cloned [2], the action done by a vicious
eavesdropper, say Eve will inevitably disturb the quantum system and leave a trace in the outcome obtained by the
two legitimate users. Alice and Bob can detect the eavesdropping by analyzing the error rate of a subset of instances
chosen randomly. Since Bennett and Brassard published an original protocol in 1984 (BB84)[1], QKD attracts a great
deal of attention [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
The experimental implementation of long-distance QKD over an optical fiber channel requires the two legitimate
users to control the influence of the fluctuation of the birefringence which alters the polarization state of photons.
For overcoming this noise, several elegant QKD schemes have been developed with some unbalanced Mach-Zehnder
interferometers (MZIs), such as the QKD scheme base on the phase difference of single photon [9, 10, 11], the ”plug
and play” system [12] and its modifications [13, 14, 15, 16], the QKD system based on faithful qubit distribution
with additional qubits [17], and the QKD system with faithful single-qubit transmission [18]. With the development
of technology, the QKD system based on faithful qubit distribution [17] seems to be perfect if there is an ideal
single-photon source which can produce two photons in a deterministic time, although the success probability of this
system for BB84 protocol is no more than 1/16 in principle in a passive way. The QKD system with the faithful
single-qubit transmission technique [18] is more efficient than that in Ref.[17] as it only requires one photon in each
signal time and the qubit transmitted can reject the error arisen from collective noise by itself. Its success probability
for generating a private key is 1/4 in theory with BB84 protocol in an absolutely passive way. With some cascaded
unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometers (MZIs), a special encoder and a special decoder [19], one-way QKD can
be implemented against collective noise (with which the fluctuation is so slow in time that the alteration of the
polarization is considered to be the same over the sequence of several photons or wavepackets [17]) in a passive way
with a success probability approaching the intrinsic one in BB84 QKD protocol [1].
In those QKD protocols with phase coding [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16], the two legitimate users need not share a
reference frame for choosing the common polarization bases, which makes these protocols more convenient than those
with polarization coding in a practical application. The influence of the birefringence effect in fibers on the one-way
QKD systems [9, 10, 11] is far more severe than that on the two-way ”plug and play” QKD systems [12, 13]. Thus ”plug
and play” QKD systems [14, 15, 16] based on differential phase shift (DPS) [11] were proposed for increasing the key
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2creating efficiency with some unbalanced MZIs and Faraday mirrors. These systems are stable as the Faraday mirrors
can be used to automatically compensate for birefringence and polarization-dependent losses in the transmission fiber
[15]. Although these systems [14, 15, 16] are better than some others, there are some spaces for improving. First, most
faint laser pulses split by the front Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI) are combined again by the next ones, which
makes the key creation efficiency improved be limited. Second, in order to compensate for the amplitude differences
caused by the overall interference of pulses travelling through different paths, phase shifters should be inserted in the
long arms of MZIs, which increases the complexity and decreases stability of the system. Moreover, as there is no
eavesdropping check process in the first transmission, the systems are vulnerable to an eavesdropping technique known
as the intercepting-resending attack [3]. As pointed out in Ref. [20], for each block of transmission, an eavesdropping
checking is inevitable for secure communication no matter what is transmitted with a quantum channel.
In this paper, we propose a stable and deterministic QKD system based on DPS with a high key creation efficiency
approaching 100% by using the least cascaded MZIs with different arm-length differences. Compared with that in
Ref.[15], the key generation efficiency is 7/8 in principle, more than 3/4, when the two parties exploit three MZIs
for creating their private key. Its security is much higher than the latter. Moreover, this system is stable and
deterministic. Any birefringence effects and polarization-dependent losses in the long-distance fiber are automatically
compensated with a Faraday mirror. The modulation of the phase shifts is also more easier than others, and the
classical information exchanged is reduced largely.
II. STABLE AND DETERMINISTIC QKD SYSTEM
Fig.1 shows the setup of our QKD system based on DPS. It is made up of three cascaded MZIs (MZI1, MZI2, and
MZI3) in Bob’s site for creating a private key, and a Faraday mirror and a phase modulator in Alice’s site. Similar
to Ref. [15, 16], the MZIs, with long and short arms connected by 50%:50% fiber couplers C1 - C5, are designed to
have different arm-length differences so that each pulse split by the front MZI does not overlap with others in the
process of preparing the quantum signal. The time delays between the long and the short arm of MZI1, MZI2, and
MZI3 are 4T, 2T, and T, respectively. The Faraday mirror is used to automatically compensate for birefringence and
polarization-dependent losses in the transmission fiber. The phase modulator is used to encode the key.
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FIG. 1: Stable and deterministic DPS-based QKD system with a key creation efficiency of 7/8. LD represents laser diode.
C1-C7 represent 50%:50% couplers. MZI1, MZI2, MZI3, and MZI4 are four Mach-Zehnder interferometers with different arm-
length differences 4T, 2T, T, and T, respectively. L1-L4 and S1-S4 are the long (L) arms and the short (S) arms of MZIs,
respectively. D1-D4 are four avalanche photon detectors. PM, FM, and A represent a phase modulator, a Faraday mirror, and
an attenuator, respectively. For eavesdropping check, Alice samples a subset of quantum signals with beam splitter (BS) and
measured them with another MZI (MZI4) by choosing two bases (φ
′
A ∈ {0, pi/2}).
An original pulse ψ1 = e
−iφ0 |t1〉 from a laser diode is split into two sequential pulses with a time interval 4T by
passing through MZI1, i.e., ψ
1
2 = e
−iφ0 |t1〉 and ψ22 = e−iφ0 |t5〉 are combined at the second coupler C2 at time instances
t1 and t5. Where φ0 is the initial phase factor and the subscript 2 in ψ
i
2 is used to label the second coupler. We
neglect the global factor in each pulse in this paper. Subsequently, each of the pulses is split into two sequential pulses
by MZI2 with a time interval 2T, i.e., there are four pulses described as
ψ13 = e
−iφ0 |t1〉, ψ23 = e−iφ0 |t3〉,
ψ33 = e
−iφ0 |t5〉, ψ43 = e−iφ0 |t7〉. (1)
3After MZI3 with a time interval T, there are eight sequential pulses arriving at the coupler C5. These eight pulses
have the same amplitude and the delay between two near pulses is T (shown in Fig.2). These eight pulses can be
described as
ψ15 = e
−iφ0 |t1〉, ψ25 = e−i(φ0+φB)|t2〉,
ψ35 = e
−iφ0 |t3〉, ψ45 = e−i(φ0+φB)|t4〉,
ψ55 = e
−iφ0 |t5〉, ψ65 = e−i(φ0+φB)|t6〉,
ψ75 = e
−iφ0 |t7〉, ψ85 = e−i(φ0+φB)|t8〉, (2)
where φB is a phase shift added by Bob for preparing the quantum signal. Bob chooses randomly one of the four phase
shifts {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} for each original pulse ψ1 = e−iφ0 |t1〉 in the quantum communication. That is, Bob chooses
four nonorthogonal phase-coding states to carry the message transmitted, which is similar to the way in polarization
coding that the two legitimate users choose four nonorthogonal states {|0〉, |1〉, (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2, (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2} to
complete a deterministic quantum communication [21, 22]. This feature can forbid an eavesdropper to eavesdrop the
QKD system freely with intercepting-resending attack [3].
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FIG. 2: Process of the key creation. A pulse from the LD is split into two pulses after travelling through MZI1, and MZI2 and
MZI3 split them into four and eight pulses, respectively. When these pulses are reflected back after coding, 7/8 of the pulses
interfere at the coupler C4 and can be used to generate the private key, higher than 3/4 in Ref. [15].
When the eight pulses arrive at Alice’s site, she first attenuates the signal with a variable attenuator and then
encodes her random key on the odd pulses with the same phase shift φA ∈ {0, pi}. 0 and pi represent the bit values in
key string 0 and 1, respectively. After the coding performed by Alice, the quantum signal becomes
ψA = e
−i(φ0+φA)|t1〉+ e−i(φ0+φB)|t2〉+ e−i(φ0+φA)|t3〉
+ e−i(φ0+φB)|t4〉+ e−i(φ0+φA)|t5〉+ e−i(φ0+φB)|t6〉
+ e−i(φ0+φA)|t7〉+ e−i(φ0+φB)|t8〉. (3)
Alice reflects the quantum signal to Bob by a Faraday mirror, same as Ref.[12, 13, 14, 15, 16].
When the pulses are reflected to Bob’s site and pass through the MZI3 and the coupler C4, their state becomes
ψB = e
−iφ0{e−iφA |t1〉+ e−iφB (1 + e−iφA)(|t2〉+ |t4〉
+ |t6〉+ |t8〉) + (e−2iφB + e−iφA)(|t3〉+ |t5〉
+ |t7〉) + e−2iφB |t9〉}. (4)
Bob can read out the key with success probability 7/8 by using two detectors D1 and D2. When φA = 0, the pulse
train clicks the detector D1 at the time instances t2, t4, t6, or t8; Otherwise, it clicks the detector D2 at one of these
four time instances. At the other three time instances t3, t5, and t7, the detector clicked depends on both the phase
shifts φA and φB , shown in Eq.(4). In detail, when 2φB ⊕ 2pi = φA, the pulse train clicks the detector D1 at the time
instances t3, t5, or t7; Otherwise, it clicks the detector D2. In a word, Bob can obtain the key with his phase shift φB
at the time instances t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, or t8 in a deterministic way. At the time instances t1 and t9, no interference
takes place and the pulse train will click one of the two detectors randomly, which happens with the probability 1/8.
Bob discards these useless time instances. In quantum communication, Bob need only tell Alice the fact that he
4detects a photon or not in the useful time instances, which will reduce the classical information exchanged largely,
compared with that in Ref.[15, 16] as Bob does not announce the detailed time slots.
In order to prevent Eve from eavesdropping with intercepting-resending attack strategy, we add a phase shift
φB ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} in Bob’s site. Moreover, a eavesdropping check is designed in Alice’s site. That is, Alice should
sample some quantum signals randomly and measure them with two nonorthogonal phase bases, shown in Fig.1,
same as Ref.[21, 22]. Without these two tricks, this DPS QKD protocol is insecure. We give the detail of a special
intercepting-resending attack strategy to demonstrate the necessity of the procedure of eavesdropping check. This
strategy works in the protocols in Refs.[14, 15, 16], which means these two QKD protocols is insecure in principle. For
obtaining the phase shifts performed by Alice, Eve first intercepts all the eight pulses travelling through the coupler
C5 and then stores them. She prepares another pulse a and splits it into two parts, b and c. For evading the energy
check done by Alice, Eve controls the intensity of her pulses b and c to be equal to each of the eight pulses |t1〉-|t8〉 sent
by Bob. Eve sends the part c to Bob, instead of each of the eight pulses. No matter what the phase shift φA ∈ {0, pi}
is chosen by Alice, Eve can in principle get this information by interfering the part b with c when it is reflected from
Alice. In this way, Eve can pretend Alice and encodes Alice’s phase shift on the original eight pulses and resends them
to Bob. This attack will in principle leave nothing in the outcome obtained by the two legitimate users. The same
way can be used to attack the quantum communication in Refs.[14, 15, 16]. For example, for the pulse train P1 in
Ref. [15], Eve replaces the original one with the part c and sends it to Alice. No matter what the phase shift is chosen
by Alice from the two values {pi/3, 4pi/3}, Eve need only add a phase shift −2pi/3 on the part b and then interfere it
with the part c reflected by Alice. Obviously, Eve can determine that the phase shift performed by Alice is pi/3 or
4pi/3 in principle. The phase shifts on the other three pulse train P2, P3, and P4 can also be obtained in the same
way. In essence, this insecurity comes from the lack of the eavesdropping check done by Alice. As pointed out in Ref.
[20], for each block of transmission, an eavesdropping checking is inevitable for secure communication no matter what
is transmitted with a quantum channel. This principle can be used to ensure the security of our DPS QKD system. If
the influence of the birefringence effect in fiber is large enough, Alice should prepare a subset of nonorthogonal pulses
with which she replace some signal pulses with a probability pd for preventing Eve from measuring the pulses reflected
by Alice. She can produce her nonorthogonal pulses by randomly adding one of the two phase shifts φA ∈ {0, pi/2}
on some signal pulses. In this time, Bob should modulate her another phase shift φ′B ∈ {0, pi/2} besides φB with a
small probability. For improving the key creation rate, Alice and Bob can use two biased phase bases to prepare and
measure the nonorthogonal pulses, same as that in Ref. [6].
III. SUMMARY
In summary, we have proposed a stable and deterministic QKD system based on DPS. The most specific feature of
this DPS QKD system is the high key creation efficiency and the high security. By using three MZIs with different
arm-length differences for creating key (the fourth MZI is used to check eavesdropping), the efficiency is improved to
be 7/8, more than 3/4 in Ref. [15]. Moreover, this system is expansible. With n MZIs for creating the key, the key
creation efficiency can be added up to 2
n−1
2n , higher than
n
n+1 in Ref. [15] (much higher than that in Ref.[16]). When
n is large enough, the efficiency approaches 100%. Another feature is the high security. With eavesdropping check
and nonorthogonal pulses, this QKD system is obviously more secure than that in Ref. [15]. Moreover, this system
is stable and deterministic, and the classical information exchanged is reduced largely.
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